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4.1 Introduction
The United States spends more on health care in per capita terms and as
a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) than any other developed
country (Reinhardt, Hussey, and Anderson 2004). This can be interpreted
in two ways. One is that the elevated spending is symptomatic of failure in
the health care system. Money is wasted through administrative overhead,
the overuse of fully insured health care, or the provision of expensive terti-
ary but only marginally useful technology.1A diﬀerent view is that U.S. cit-
izens demand, and get, a higher quality level of health care than anywhere
else in the world. It may be expensive, but the technological advances pro-
vided in the United States have led to dramatic improvements in function-
ing and life expectancy.2
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1. For a good presentation of this view, see Evans and Stoddart (1994).
2. For a general exposition of the view that current high spending levels for medical tech-
nology will yield beneﬁts that could even lower costs in the future, see Pardes and others
(1999). For speciﬁc measures of improvements in outcomes following the use of more inten-
sive technology, see Cutler and others (1998) and Cutler and Meara (1999).Knowing which story holds true is crucial for any kind of health care
reform, and particularly for Medicare reform. Unfortunately, the answer
is elusive. While the evidence strongly suggests substantial technological
gains in the treatment of speciﬁc diseases such as heart attacks or speciﬁc
groups such as low-birth-weight infants (e.g., Cutler et al. 1998; Cutler and
Meara 1999), it is not clear how well these speciﬁc paradigms generalize to
the entire health care system where medical progress has not been nearly
so robust. More importantly, the secular improvements in mortality are
“average” eﬀects of technology rather than the marginal impact of greater
health care intensity on health outcomes (see Cutler 2000).
Researchers have attempted to exploit “natural randomization” in out-
comes data to estimate the marginal eﬀectiveness of speciﬁc medical
technologies on outcomes such as mortality for people with heart attacks
(McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse 1994) or for infants (Currie and
Gruber 1996). For example, in McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse the
“treatment” group was people experiencing heart attacks who lived rela-
tively near a hospital equipped with diagnostic laboratory facilities that
helped physicians decide whether to proceed with surgery. The “control”
group was those living relatively far away. They found minimal beneﬁts
among the population treated most intensively for heart attacks. It is not
known how well this ﬁnding for heart attack patients, where the quality
of the scientiﬁc evidence is high, generalizes to daily decisions about
treatment for chronically ill patients, where the scientiﬁc evidence is quite
modest.
In this paper, we use the idea of natural randomization to evaluate the
eﬃciency of the Medicare program more generally. The macro-level
equivalent of living near a hospital with advanced diagnostic laboratories
for heart attack patients is whether the health care system provides a
higher-than-average intensity of health care, ranging from ﬂu shots in the
outpatient setting, to hospitalization instead of outpatient care, surgery
instead of watchful waiting, and three-month waiting periods for physi-
cian appointments instead of six-month waiting periods for appoint-
ments.
Simply comparing outcomes between regions with higher-than-average
and lower-than-average Medicare expenditures risks the reverse causality
problem; the sickest regions tend to experience more spending on health
care.3A deeper issue is the diﬃculty in comparing multidimensional health
care systems across regions. One region may spend more to provide “eﬀec-
tive” care of proven clinical value (such as ﬂu shots, mammograms among
women over age ﬁfty, and eye examinations for diabetics), another region
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3. In an earlier study, Hadley (1988) used as instruments for Medicare expenditures factors
such as nursing home residence rates; he found a positive impact of Medicare spending on
survival. However, nursing home residence rates are probably correlated with unmeasured re-
gional health status.may spend more because it provides surgery where nonsurgical alterna-
tives often exist (such as back surgery or knee replacements), while physi-
cians in a third region could be more likely to admit chronically ill patients
to a hospital or refer them to a specialist.
In the empirical section, we focus on several “markers” for the diﬀerent
dimensions of intensity. With regard to eﬀective care, we need not instru-
ment for reverse causality, since there is no reason why annual eye exam-
inations for diabetics (for example) should be lower or higher in regions
with greater incidence of disease. In every region, the “right rate” among
the relevant population is nearly 100 percent, and so we can use this
marker for quality without adjusting for potential reverse causality. How-
ever, ﬁnding a marker for intensity of care among chronically ill patients
is more diﬃcult, since patients in regions with greater prevalence of dis-
ease might be expected to account for more Medicare spending. We use
two types of instruments that we believe on clinical grounds should not be
biased by diﬀerences across regions in underlying health status. The ﬁrst
focuses on utilization (physician visits and intensive care unit [ICU] days)
in the last six months of life. By deﬁnition, these patients are similar with
regard to health status across regions for one important dimension of
health: their six-month survival rate. Obviously, one cannot use treat-
ment patterns in the last six months to make inferences about Medicare
eﬃciency in this group, since they are all dead by the end of the period.
Instead, the intensity of care in the last six months is used as an instru-
ment to measure whether Medicare enrollees who are alive at the begin-
ning of the year gain survival beneﬁts from higher levels of Medicare
spending for the type of care typically provided to those with chronic ill-
nesses.
The second instrument takes a prospective approach for a disease with
“high-tech” treatments: regional price-adjusted averages of one-year
Medicare part A (hospital) expenditures for a cohort of patients following
acute myocardial infarction (AMI), or heart attacks. Again, expenditures
for AMI are likely to be good measures of the intensity of health care in the
region, although in this case the dimension of intensity may diﬀer since re-
gions with more aggressive surgical treatment of AMI will tend to experi-
ence higher costs for the treatment of AMI patients. Like end-of-life
Medicare enrollees, patients who have experienced an AMI tend to be sim-
ilar across regions with regard to their initial health status.
Using data from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care as well as supple-
mental information from the U.S. Census and the Centers for Disease Con-
trol, we estimate the incremental eﬀects of these diﬀerent types of spend-
ing, both in a linear model and, where appropriate, in a nonlinear
framework (Newey, Powell, and Vella 1999). We ﬁnd that higher measures
of “eﬃcient” care are associated with better survival for the general popu-
lation but are not associated with higher costs. However, we also ﬁnd that
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cian visits, and with more intensive treatment of AMI patients, are not as-
sociated with greater overall rates of survival in the Medicare population;
in other words, we estimate a “ﬂat of the curve” segment in which regions
spend more but gain no beneﬁt in higher survival.
These results are consistent with two recent studies focusing on out-
comes for cohorts of AMI, colon cancer, and hip fracture patients (Fisher
et al. 2003a,b), rather than the entire Medicare population, as we do here.
They found evidence of worse outcomes—that is, higher mortality rates—
associated with higher levels of health care intensity. In short, our esti-
mates imply that physicians and hospitals participating in the Medicare
program provide too little in the way of inexpensive and eﬀective care,
while at the same time spending $26 billion annually, or nearly 20 percent
of the Medicare program’s budget for health care that appears to be of
questionable value with regard to survival beneﬁts.
4.2 The Nature of the Problem: Per Capita Medicare 
Expenditures in the United States
We ﬁrst consider the magnitude and extent of regional diﬀerences in
Medicare expenditures in the United States. Primary data sources are
samples of either 20 percent (outpatient) or 100 percent (inpatient) of the
Medicare claims data during 1995 and 1996. The basic unit of analysis is
the hospital referral region (HRR), of which there are 306 in the United
States. The HRR was constructed in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care
as a unit of analysis that reﬂected the actual hospital migration patterns of
Medicare patients for tertiary care. An HRR must include at least one hos-
pital that performs cardiac surgery and neurosurgery. Each zip code in the
United States is assigned to an HRR depending on what hospital the ma-
jority (or, in some cases, the plurality) of Medicare enrollees seek their hos-
pital care; see Wennberg and Cooper (1999) for details. Thus, the HRR
may cross county or state boundaries or, in some cases, follow interstate
highways.
The important thing to note about HRRs for this study is that all rates
are based upon the zip code of residence and not where the person actu-
ally sought care. Thus, if an individual lives in Lebanon, New Hampshire,
and is admitted to a hospital in Boston, all utilization is assigned to the
Lebanon HRR. Most care is delivered locally; 80 percent of the U.S. pop-
ulation lives in HRRs in which over 85 percent of care is delivered by pro-
viders within the HRR. In the analysis that follows, utilization rates have
been adjusted for diﬀerences across HRRs in the age, sex, and racial com-
position of the population, and (where necessary) diﬀerences in the price
level. We restrict our attention to the fee-for-service Medicare population
132 Jonathan Skinner, Elliott S. Fisher, and John E. WennbergThe Eﬃciency of Medicare 133
Fig. 4.1 Noncapitated Medicare expenditures per enrollee, 1996
that during the study period accounted for more than 85 percent of the to-
tal Medicare population.4
Figure 4.1 uses these data from Wennberg and Cooper (1999) to con-
struct a map showing the distribution of per capita Medicare expenditures
across the United States in 1996; these are adjusted for diﬀerences across re-
gions in age, sex, and race (black and nonblack). There are clearly wide vari-
ations in the extent of spending, with per capita expenditures ranging from
$3,341 in Minneapolis, for example, to $8,414 in Miami. There are clusters
of high-expenditure regions largely concentrated in Florida, the deep
South, and urban areas on the East and West coasts. There are exceptions
as well: inexpensive regions in Florida and low-cost cities on the West Coast
(e.g., Portland, Oregon) and the East Coast (Richmond, Virginia).
This ﬁgure raises some immediate policy issues. If the higher expendi-
4. One concern with using the fee-for-service population is the selection problem; healthier
patients tend to enroll in health maintenance organizations (HMOs). We control for this in
part by measuring health status (discussed presently) for the same fee-for-service population.
Thus, if a healthy region experiences a high rate of HMO enrollment, leaving an unhealthy fee-
for-service population, this will be reﬂected in both health status measures and in per capita
spending. In practice, either including the percentage of the HMO population in the HRR, or
excluding regions with more than 10 percent HMO enrollment, has little impact on the results.134 Jonathan Skinner, Elliott S. Fisher, and John E. Wennberg
Fig. 4.2 Per capita Medicare expenditures and mortality rates in the Medicare
population, 1996
Note: Medicare expenditures and mortality rates are age, sex, and race adjusted; both apply
to the fee-for-service population.
tures in some regions actually lead to better health, then the Medicare pro-
gram may be inequitable to the extent that taxpayers in the low-expenditure
regions are paying for the better health of those in the high-expenditure re-
gions (Feenberg and Skinner 2000). Conversely, if the higher expenditures
yield nothing in health beneﬁts, then there is tremendous waste in the pro-
gram; reducing spending in the high-expenditure areas can save enough
money to preserve the solvency of the Medicare trust fund by a decade
(Skinner and Wennberg 2000). It could also be the case that people in the
high-expenditure areas simply prefer more intensive care. One might then
ask why other regions should be subsidizing their preferences.
To consider the eﬃciency of Medicare, we provide a simple graph in ﬁg-
ure 4.2 that shows per capita Medicare expenditures (age, sex, race, and
price-adjusted) on the horizontal axis and survival, which we deﬁne as the 
(1 – age-sex-race-adjusted mortality)   100, on the vertical axis. There is a
clear negative correlation between expenditures and survival. This in itself is
not too surprising; spending should be higher in regions with poorer levels
of health, so we might expect to observe Mobile, Alabama, spending more
than Grand Junction, Colorado. In the next section, we consider a simple
model that formalizes how to evaluate the eﬃciency of Medicare given that
Medicare spending is likely to be higher in regions with poor health.
4.3 Medicare Expenditures and Outcomes: 
Theoretical and Measurement Issues
In this section, we ﬁrst develop a theoretical model of Medicare expen-
ditures and outcomes and show that the observed negative correlation be-tween Medicare expenditures and survival in ﬁgure 4.2 is at least consistent
with the Medicare program meeting stringent eﬃciency conditions. We
then develop criteria for determining what one should expect in terms of
better survival.
4.3.1 A Theoretical Model of Regional Diﬀerences 
in Medicare Expenditures
We next turn to evaluating the eﬃciency of the Medicare program with
regard to diﬀerences across regions in health care spending. It is important
to emphasize at the outset that there are many inputs into the production
of health care, some of which may yield substantial health beneﬁts at little
costs, and others of which may provide little in beneﬁts but exert a larger
impact on costs. In this study, it is impossible to characterize all of these in-
puts, but we can try to provide a rough categorization of regional diﬀer-
ences in the intensity of three dimensions of inputs to health care.5
The ﬁrst is “eﬀective” care, treatments where there is strong clinical evi-
dence as to their eﬃcacy and where, among the relevant population of
patients, nearly 100 percent should be receiving the treatment. Examples
include eye examinations for diabetics, ﬂu shots for the elderly, mammo-
grams for women over age ﬁfty, and the use of beta blockers and aspirin
among appropriate heart attack candidates. The second categorization is
“preference-sensitive” care, or treatments where there are valid options
forh ow to treat the speciﬁc disease, and choices often involve trade-oﬀs
between risks and beneﬁts of treatment. For example, knee replacement
surgery can provide long-term beneﬁts in functioning, but there is a non-
trivial risk of surgical complications and a lengthy period of recovery.
Similarly, angioplasty for the treatment of ischemic heart disease carries
with it the risk of stroke or operative death, but it can provide relief of
symptoms.6 These treatment options typically do not have a large impact
on long-term survival but can potentially aﬀect functioning and quality of
life. Unfortunately, we cannot measure quality of life, only quantity in
terms of survival rates. Thus, there is unlikely to be any inﬂuence on mor-
tality of greater intensity of preference-sensitive care.
Finally, the third category is “supply-sensitive” care, where the quality
of scientiﬁc evidence regarding use of care is poor and the quantity of care
tends to be associated with the supply of resources such as specialists and
hospital beds. Measures of the prevalence of supply-sensitive care include
the frequency of physician visits and the use of ICU days among chroni-
cally ill patients. Note that we do not presume causality from supply to the
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5. This categorization is developed in Wennberg, Fisher, and Skinner (2002).
6. Angioplasty is proven to be eﬀective for reperfusion within twenty-four hours of the on-
set of an AMI, and for this use it is less likely considered preference sensitive. However, the
vast majority of angioplasties (more than 85 percent) are performed on non-AMI patients.use of supply-sensitive care, simply a correlation between factors of supply
and the quantity of supply-sensitive care.
There are separate eﬃciency conditions for each of these inputs and in
each region. Suppose that the value function of the “social planner” is writ-
ten in terms of
(1) V   V[S(R, H), Q(R, H), Y(1    )   (1    )M∗, P],
where V is a concave value function, the bold-faced Sdenotes the vector of
(regional) per capita survival measures for regions i   1, . . . N, Q the vec-
tor measuring quality of life (conditional on survival), and R is the K   N
vector of inputs (for example, inputs that are eﬃcient, preference sensitive,
and supply sensitive) for each of the N regions. With regard to the third ar-
gument, after-tax income (assumed to be equal to consumption), M∗is the
level of real per capita total health care expenditures, and within each re-
gion total expenditures are a function of the intensity of inputs conditional
on health status and the health of the population Hso that M∗ H(R, H).
Nonmedical consumption is given by Y(1 –  ) – (1 –  )M∗: gross income
Y after the Medicare tax   has been paid and Medicare’s share of (out-of-
pocket) medical expenses   has been paid. Note that total Medicare ex-
penditures are therefore M    M∗. Medicare taxes are assumed to be pro-
portional to income.7 Finally, the population of each region is given by P;
this is to allow for larger regions to receive a larger weight in the social wel-
fare function. While the Medicare program is a complex intergenerational
transfer mechanism in which younger workers pay most of the taxes ulti-
mately consumed by the elderly, we assume for analytic simplicity that the
people paying the taxes in region i are the same ones experiencing the ben-
eﬁts in region i.8
Increasing Medicare spending in just one region i is assumed to result in
an increase in the overall Medicare tax rate  :  Mi     Σj[(P j Y j )/P i]. Thus,
the balanced budget change in the tax rate necessary to fund an extra (per
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7. The Medicare payroll tax that funds part A, or the hospital component, is proportional
to earnings. While the part B (physician) premium is regressive, the larger proportion funded
by general tax revenue is progressive; overall, the tax is not far from proportional. See Mc-
Clellan and Skinner (1999).
8. See, for example, Feenberg and Skinner (2000).where V 1i is the contribution of an incremental increase of survival in re-
gion i to the social welfare function, V 2i the contribution of quality of life
(conditional on survival), and V 3i the impact of after-tax nonmedical in-
come on social welfare of the entire country. (Note that the constant frac-
tion   dMi/dMi∗ drops out of equation [3].)
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The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side measures the marginal value of
Medicare expenditures on survival in region i, while the second term is the
improvement in functioning and quality of life, expressed in terms relative
to the incremental social value of increasing survival (V 2/V 1). Unfortu-
nately, we do not have good data on Qi, the level of functioning in a region,
and so we will not be able to estimate dQi/dRik directly, although evidence
on this question is discussed presently.
Suppose that the value function V is linear, so there is a uniform social
trade-oﬀbetween increasing survival by one unit and reducing after-tax in-
come by  . Thus,   is the conventional cost-eﬀectiveness “hurdle,” or how
much is society willing to spend to increase survival rates by a given
amount under the assumption that the health inputs have no impact on
quality of life, hence dQi/dRik   0. In this special case,   V 3/V 1, ∀ i, j,








k         1.
In other words, all regions should devote expenditures up to the point
where the marginal gains are equal, both across types of care, and across
regions. In the case of a speciﬁc factor that raises spending, we can con-
sider this scenario in ﬁgure 4.3, with the same dimensions as those shown
in ﬁgure 4.2: expenditures (or intensity) on the horizontal axis and survival
on the vertical axis. Combinations of expenditures and survival rates are
shown for three regions, A, B, and C, as well as each of their concave health
“production functions.” The slopes of each of the straight tangential lines
are equal to   so that dSi/dMi   across regions. Furthermore, this graph
replicates the general pattern of spending and survival shown in the em-
pirical data in ﬁgure 4.2. Accounting for the concavity of the value func-
tion V would imply eﬃciency conditions that would move region A further
along its production function to A , and would move C to C , resulting in
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(or instruments) for the intensity of care, we specify a model where survival
Si is a general nonlinear function of Medicare expenditures in that region,
S(Mi), that is,
(6) Si   S(Mi, Zi)   ui,
where Zi is a vector of underlying observable health characteristics. A sim-
pliﬁed version of this equation is
(6 ) Si   S(Mi)    Zi   ui,
where   is the corresponding vector of coeﬃcients; thus,  Zi shifts the pro-
ductivity curves vertically with respect to observable diﬀerences in health
status. To the extent that unobservable health status is reﬂected in the error
term ui, it will be correlated with Medicare spending, leading to inconsistent
estimates in a single-equation model. We therefore model Medicare expen-
ditures as a nonlinear function of the (uncontaminated) measures of inten-
sity Rik so that as regions increase Rik, spending on this input (and associ-
ated treatments) also would tend to increase in a potentially nonlinear way:
(7) Mi   M(Rik)   ZiΠ   ei,
where Πis a vector of coeﬃcients and eithe error term. This block-diagonal
structure is well suited to estimation using the methods developed in Newey,
Powell, and Vella (1999); we return to estimation issues in section 4.4.
4.3.2 How much should survival rates diﬀer across regions?
The theoretical model suggested that it is important in assessing eﬃ-
ciency to measure the impact of the marginal dollar of Medicare spending
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Fig. 4.3 Eﬃciency in health care
Note: A, B, and C represent regions. At each point, the slope of the health care productivity
curve is equal (and shown by the straight line passing through points A, B, and C).(for each dimension) on health outcomes. As a ﬁrst step, we would like to
know how much diﬀerence in survival rates we would expect to see under
the null hypothesis that incremental Medicare expenditures yield ﬁrst-
order health beneﬁts. In the short term, we would expect to see a jump in
survival. If we viewed the social  to be $100,000 per additional year of life,
then spending an extra $1,000 per capita in Medicare spending should, in
the short term, yield a drop in mortality rates (or increase in survival rates)
of 1.0 percentage points. Over the long term, the mortality rate would
climb back up as those patients saved early on ultimately die.
To quantify the change in survival and mortality rates at the level of the
population that is consistent with the micro-level cost-eﬀectiveness bench-
marks, we develop a simple model using the life tables for 1991 from
Wilmoth (2001). Figure 4.4 shows the benchmark survival pattern for the
U.S. population in 1991 (the leftmost curve); the average mortality rate is
5.2 percent in this population, which is consistent with mortality in the
Medicare population. Next, suppose an innovation is introduced that re-
duces annual mortality rates by 25 percent, for example, leading to the
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Fig. 4.4 Baseline survival curve and counterfactual survival curve after 25 percent
decline in mortality raterightward shift in the survival curve (ﬁgure 4.4). The population-weighted
decline in the mortality rates is 1.3 percentage points, down to 3.9 percent.
In the steady state (assuming no population growth), the population is
larger by 11 percent, the area between the two curves. In other words, the
implicit numerical derivative of the percentage change in steady-state life
years per 1 percentage point change in the mortality rate is equal to 11/(5.2
– 3.9) or 9.0.9 Conversely, a “hurdle” rate of $100,000 per life year implies
that every increase of $1,000 in per capita Medicare expenditures should
increase survival rates by 1/9, or 0.11 percentage points.
This hurdle rate may be too low. As noted previously, short-run eﬀects
are larger than long-run eﬀects, and to the extent that Medicare spending
has risen dramatically in the last decade, we might expect to observe a
larger impact on survival. Second, Medicare does not cover all expendi-
tures for the care measured in the claims data, so we are underestimating
the true cost of the medical care, which will tend to bias our results toward
ﬁnding that Medicare spending at the margin is eﬃcient. Finally, the
$100,000 hurdle is often given for a year of life in perfect health, and one is
rarely extending life years in perfect health; indeed, the increased survival
may be at the expense of quite poor health functioning. On the other hand,
if functioning is improved as well as survival, one may require less im-
provement in survival to justify the incremental Medicare expenditures, an
issue to which we return presently.
4.4 Measuring Health Care Intensity
First, with regard to the intensity of “eﬃcient” care, Wennberg and
Cooper (1999) measured the frequency of use where appropriate for eleven
treatments or screening methods that are generally agreed upon to be ef-
fective in medical care; this includes the fraction of women in the Medi-
care population who were screened for breast cancer (mammography), the
percentage of diabetics administered blood tests and eye exams, and the
percentage receiving a pneumonia vaccination. Averaged in with these
measures are quality measures for the treatment of heart attacks; the
percentage of appropriate patients in each HRR who received eﬀective
drug treatment such as aspirin, beta blockers, and angiotensin-converting
enzyme (ACE) inhibitors, for example.10One would not expect 100 percent
compliance for a variety of reasons, but in general the quality indexes were
quite low, with a (weighted) mean of 48 percent and a range from 32 to 57
percent (see table 4.1), with a higher index indicating better quality care.
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9. We chose the 25 percent mortality decline to make the diﬀerences apparent in ﬁgure 4.4.
Smaller changes in mortality yield the same numerical derivatives, however.
10. These latter indicators are drawn from the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project, or CCP,
a detailed study of more than 200,000 heart attacks in the United States. See Jencks, Huff, and
Cuerdon (2003) for a more comprehensive measure of quality by state.We also include a measure for preference-sensitive care that averages
age-sex-race-adjusted rates of ten surgical procedures by HRR that in-
clude back surgery, angioplasty, bypass surgery, prostatectomy, knee re-
placements, and hip replacements. We note, however, that because our
outcomes measures do not reﬂect functioning and quality of life—the fac-
tors most likely to be aﬀected by these procedures—we would not expect
that survival should be aﬀected strongly by the intensity of surgical rates.
There may even be trade-oﬀs where more intensive surgical rates lead to
greater operative mortality, but better functioning, for those who survive.
Thus, while we do not consider whether preference-sensitive care is asso-
ciated with better survival, we can ask whether regions that are more ag-
gressive with regard to surgery also experience higher Medicare costs.
We also consider instruments for supply-sensitive care where there are
few guidelines for the appropriate treatment of chronically ill patients. As
noted earlier, we consider two approaches to providing a marker for this
type of care. The ﬁrst is physician visits per decedent in the last six months
of life. We focus on this group because by looking at those near death, we
are at least comparing health care utilization across a group of largely very
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics
Standard 
Dependent variable Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Medicare expenditures (in $1,000) 5.08 0.86 3.12 8.86
Heart attack (AMI) rate (per 1,000) 19.45 2.91 11.44 29.44
Stroke (CVA) rate (per 1,000) 22.95 2.84 15.24 32.47
Gastrointestinal bleeding rate (per 1,000) 15.16 1.64 10.54 20.43
Colon cancer rate (per 1,000) 4.74 0.54 2.83 6.34
Lung cancer rate (per 1,000) 1.42 0.28 0.50 2.28
Hip fracture rate (per 1,000) 15.55 1.53 9.20 19.62
Physician visits in the last 6 months 
(per decedent) 24.20 7.12 8.5 47.9
Decedents admitted to ICU in last 
6 months (%) 31.26 5.71 14.2 49.3
Avg. AMI Medicare Part A expenditures 
(in $1,000) 15.63 1.69 11.66 21.92
Fraction living in poverty 13.10 5.59 4.66 32.73
Avg. Social Security income (in $1,000) 7.760 0.61 6.056 9.532
Elderly living alone (%) 35.02 3.62 20.8 41.9
Cigarette smokers (%) 23.47 2.47 13.7 30.8
Obese (%) 17.09 1.84 11.9 22.0
Seat belt users (%) 28.39 8.23 12.8 59.6
Binge drinkers (%) 13.41 3.61 6.3 23.2
High school graduates (%) 49.37 4.68 31.91 58.89
College graduates (%) 25.55 6.23 11.49 52.24
Eﬀectiveness index 47.08 4.06 32.21 56.74
Survival rate (%) 94.70 0.34 93.78 95.99sick patients. Figure 4.5 shows a turnip graph of the distribution of physi-
cian visits in the last six months of life; each dot represents average rates
for a hospital referral region (HRR).11 The rates vary widely, from 8.5 in
Grand Junction, Colorado, to 43 in Ridgewood, New Jersey, and nearly 48
in Miami. As well, we also consider the percentage of Medicare enrollees
who in their last six months are admitted to an ICU. This value again varies
widely, from 14 percent in Sun City, Arizona, to 49 percent in Miami,
Florida, and Munster, Indiana.
In addition to end-of-life care, which might be expected to reﬂect that
fraction of health care spending devoted toward ineﬀective care, we also
take a prospective approach and consider twelve-month part A Medicare
expenditures for a 100 percent sample of fee-for-service Medicare patients
aged sixty-ﬁve and over who were admitted during 1993–94 for AMI.
(Diﬀerent years are used to ensure that AMI expenditures are not them-
selves components of overall Medicare expenditures in 1995–96.) Costs
have been adjusted for the underlying demographics (age, sex, race) and
comorbidities of each patient (at the individual level); as well, price diﬀer-
ences across regions have been adjusted using the Dartmouth Atlas price
index, which is in turn based on Zuckerman, Welch, and Pope (1990). This
measure of intensity reﬂects both the propensity of hospitals to treat heart
attacks using high-tech revascularization and the likelihood of follow-up
hospitalization and other inpatient treatments during the subsequent year,
and thus reﬂects a broader dimension of care than just treatments for
chronically ill patients. The mean level of expenditures is $15,632, with a
range from $11,664 to $21,917.
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Fig. 4.5 Average number of physician visits per decedent during the last six months
of life (1995–96)
Source: www.dartmouthatlas.org, Wennberg and Cooper (1999).
11. Think of this as a vertical histogram with the rows centered.4.5 Estimating the Eﬃciency of Medicare Expenditures
The basic set of covariates Zincludes age-sex-race-adjusted population-
based measures at the HRR level of hospital admissions (per 1,000 elderly
population) for AMI, stroke (CVA), gastrointestinal bleeding, hip frac-
tures, colon cancer, and lung cancer (Wennberg and Cooper 1999). Hospi-
tal admission rates for these diseases are accurate measures of the popula-
tion incidence since nearly every person with these diseases is admitted to
the hospital. In addition, we include rates of poverty in the elderly popula-
tion and average Social Security income among households receiving this
source of income, measured using the CensusCD data (based on primary
census data) at the zip code level in 1990. Since Social Security beneﬁts are
based on lifetime earnings, these provide a good (albeit nonlinear) index of
lifetime earnings. We also use the census data to measure the fraction of
elderly people living alone, since such patients may have fewer potential
caretakers and thus would be more likely to spend their last six months re-
ceiving inpatient care.12 We consider measures of behavioral health status
from the general population such as obesity, binge drinking, cigarette
smoking, and seat belt use; these are derived from Centers for Disease Con-
trol data (Bolen et al. 2000) at the state level and assigned to the HRR level
according to the relative state population weights in each HRR. These
variables are summarized in table 4.1.
Table 4.2 demonstrates that these variables combined are strongly asso-
ciated with survival rates, with an R2 of 0.56 for the full model. Interest-
ingly, the poverty rate enters with a positive coeﬃcient (that is, a higher
poverty rate implies a higher survival rate, holding constant income). In
part, this is the consequence of including comorbidities such as heart at-
tacks and hip fractures; poverty works primarily through its impact on dis-
ease categories.13
We ﬁrst consider factors that can aﬀect Medicare expenditures in the
context of a ﬁrst-stage regression. Here we use expenditures that have been
adjusted for age, sex, race, and diﬀerences in cost-of-living reimbursement
rates for Medicare services (Wennberg and Cooper 1999). To show the ex-
tent to which variations in Medicare expenditures across regions are cor-
related with covariates Z, we ﬁrst consider a parsimonious model that in-
cludes just the six measures of health status (heart attack rates, stroke rates,
etc.), with results in column (C) of table 4.2. The set of underlying health
measures explain 27 percent of the total variation in Medicare spending.
Column (D) of table 4.2 includes additional socioeconomic and behavioral
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12. This is deﬁned as the ratio of people over age sixty-ﬁve living alone divided by the total
number of people over sixty-ﬁve not in institutions or living with unrelated people.
13. Holding income constant, a larger poverty rate is consistent with a widening of the in-
come distribution—for example, more income inequality. However, the hypothesis that in-
come inequality is bad for health (e.g., Wilkinson 1997) would predict a negative coeﬃcient
on poverty rates, not a positive coeﬃcient. See also Deaton and Paxson (1999).Table 4.2 Regression models of survival and Medicare expenditures
Survival Medicare expenditure ($1,000)
Dependent variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
AMI rate (per 1,000) –0.010 –.007 –0.061 –0.004 0.028
(1.2) (0.8) (2.3) (0.2) (1.3)
Stroke rate (per 1,000) –0.038 –0.043 0.048 –0.022 –0.030
(4.5) (4.4) (1.8) (0.7) (1.1)
Gastrointestinal bleeding rate (per 1,000) –0.051 –0.054 0.190 0.168 0.050
(2.6) (3.4) (3.6) (3.8) (1.2)
Colon cancer rate (per 1,000) –0.011 –0.006 –0.062 0.152 –0.172
(0.4) (0.2) (0.6) (1.4) (1.7)
Lung cancer rate (per 1,000) 0.133 0.140 0.467 0.590 0.360
(1.4) (1.9) (2.3) (3.2) (2.3)
Hip fracture rate (per 1,000) –0.047 –0.031 0.056 0.123 0.172
(3.8) (2.0) (1.4) (3.1) (5.8)
Fraction living in poverty .026 0.068 0.058
(3.0) (2.8) (3.4)
Avg. Social Security income (in $1,000) 0.205 0.440 0.040
(2.8) (2.4) (0.3)
High school graduate (%) –0.008 –0.045 0.018
(1.6) (2.5) (1.3)
College graduate (%) –0.003 –0.016 –0.005
(0.6) (1.3) (0.5)
Binge drinking (%) 0.003 0.060 0.064
(0.6) (3.7) (4.8)
Cigarette smokers (%) –0.027 –0.073 –0.067
(2.8) (3.0) (3.1)
Obesity (%) –0.002 0.003 0.021
(0.1) (0.1) (0.8)
Seat belt use (%) 0.011 –0.003 –0.000
(4.6) (0.3) (0.1)
Elderly living alone (%) –0.017 –0.051 –0.033
(.2) (2.3) (2.3)
Index of eﬀective care –0.037 –0.023
(2.3) (1.8)
Index of preference-sensitive care –0.001 0.010
(0.0) (1.0)
Physician visits in the last 6 months (avg.) 0.063
(6.5)
One-year expenditures for AMI 0.112
(3.8)
Constant 97.124 96.372 1.052 2.474 –0.792
R2 0.46 0.56 0.27 0.46 0.64
Notes: N   306. Robust standard errors; absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. All sample sizes
weighted by Medicare population. Low variation conditions (e.g., AMI, stroke) and eﬀectiveness index
are from 1995–96, Medicare expenditures data are for 1996, poverty and Social Security data from 1990
Census, and CDC behavioral data from 1997.explanatory variables, as well as measures of eﬀective and preference-
sensitive care; these combined raise the R2 to 0.46. The counterintuitive
signs of some coeﬃcients (such as for smokers and elderly living alone), as
well as the robust correlation between income and Medicare spending,
suggest that the coeﬃcients may reﬂect factors other than health status
(McClellan and Skinner 1999). As well, note that the quality index is neg-
atively associated with Medicare expenditures; in other words, Medicare
spending does not appear to buy better quality of care. Finally, the prefer-
ence-sensitive index is not correlated with overall spending. While certain
components of surgery may be correlated (for example, cardiac bypass
surgery is positively associated with per capita Medicare expenditures), on
the whole, high-tech surgery does not appear to be the primary (or even
secondary) cause of geographical variations in spending (see Wennberg,
Fisher, and Skinner 2002).
Finally, physician visits in the last six months and expenditures for
AMI patients are highly signiﬁcant (table 4.2, column [E]) and raise the
R2to 0.64. To give some sense of how expenditures diﬀer by physician vis-
its in the last six months, we also report predicted Medicare spending
(controlling for Z) from a regression with dummy variables reﬂecting the
regional decile ranking for physician visits in the last six months. These
coeﬃcient estimates are shown visually in ﬁgure 4.6, where decile 1 (the
lowest decile) is anchored at the average Medicare spending in that decile.
We can use these estimates to calculate overall Medicare expenditures
that are explained by end-of-life physician visits; noting that each decile
contains 2.77 million elderly people in 1996, we ﬁnd net spending relative
to the bottom decile is $26 billion larger. Since overall expenditures dur-
ing the same year were about $138 billion, the variation in expenditures
attributable to end-of-life care accounts for nearly 20 percent of overall
spending.
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Fig. 4.6 Average per capita Medicare spending 1995–96, by decile of physician
visits in the last six months4.5.1 The Association between Health Care Intensity Measures 
and Regional Health Status
To what extent are the markers for intensity associated with the mea-
sures of health Z? Presumably the instruments or measures of intensity are
chosen because on a theoretical basis they are deemed exogenous. Further
ﬁndings that the health care intensity measures are uncorrelated with mea-
sured health status Z would be supportive of the exogeneity presumption
for the following reason. If the health intensity measures R are uncorre-
lated with Zs, which are themselves randomly measured from among the
wide variety of health status measures, it would be diﬃcult to argue that the
health intensity measures are in addition correlated with unmeasured
health status (see Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005). To examine this correla-
tion, we create terciles of HRRs based on three measures of intensity: the
eﬃciency index, physician visits in the last six months, and AMI expendi-
tures, with results in table 4.3. To summarize the correlation of the health
care intensity measure with regard to underlying health status in the re-
gion, we create a predicted survival measure based on coeﬃcient estimates
in column (C) of table 4.2. As noted above, this predicted measure explains
56 percent of the variation in mortality.14
For the index of eﬀective care, there is a positive and signiﬁcant correla-
tion with predicted survival, suggesting that regions with better initial
health status (as measured by the incidence of heart attacks, stroke, colon
cancer, obesity, binge drinking, poverty, and other factors) also have higher
quality physicians as well. Here we do have a strong theoretical presump-
tion that there is no reverse causation; both sick and healthy patients
should be receiving eﬀective care. As noted previously, eﬀective care is neg-
atively correlated with Medicare expenditures (p < 0.01). By contrast, for
physician visits in the last six months of life, and one-year expenditures for
AMI, predicted survival is nearly identical across the terciles. For example,
the correlation coeﬃcient between end-of-life physician visits and pre-
dicted survival is just 0.01 with a p-value of 0.88, suggesting that they are
unlikely to be associated with unmeasured health status. As expected,
these latter two factors are positively associated with overall Medicare per
capita expenditures.15
4.5.2 Linear Two-Stage Regressions
We next consider the linear two-stage regression, presented in table 4.4.
The ﬁrst two columns present regression results for the limited set of co-
variates (the six health conditions, Social Security income, and poverty
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14. Note that this predicted measure of mortality is a linear function only of Z, not of Sor u.
15. The ﬁnal measure of intensity, ICU days in the last six months, is negatively associated
with survival, with a correlation coeﬃcient of –0.27 (p   0.01).rates), with column (A) weighted by the Medicare population and column
(B) unweighted and where the model is just identiﬁed using physician vis-
its in the last six months as an instrument. The coeﬃcient estimates are
stable with regard to whether they are weighted or not. The estimated lin-
ear coeﬃcient estimates in columns (A) and (B) of table 4.4 of Medicare
expenditures on survival are 0.009 and –0.047, respectively. Neither is sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In other words, these results imply that the
roughly $26 billion in Medicare expenditures explained by the instrument
generate no clinically important (or economically important) inﬂuence on
survival. Using the Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) approach, we also
compare the regression coeﬃcient when all covariates Z are excluded. The
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Table 4.3 Terciles of Medicare expenditures and predicted survival by eﬀective care, average
physician visits in the last six months, and one-year inpatient expenditures for a
cohort of AMI patients
1st (lowest)  2nd (middle)  3rd (highest)  Correlation 
tercile: tercile: tercile:  coeﬀ. ( p-value) 
Dependent variable Eﬀective care Eﬀective care Eﬀective care (eﬀective care)
Eﬀective care (%) 43.76 47.93 51.48 1.00
Medicare expenditures  5.375 4.983 4.906 –0.263
(in $1,000) ( 0.01)
Predicted survival  94.58 94.67 94.83 0.39
(from table 4.2, column [B]) ( 0.01)
1st 2nd 3rd  Correlation 
tercile: tercile: tercile:  coeﬀ. ( p-value) 
Physician Physician Physician  (Physician 
visits visits visits visits)
Avg. physician visits in last 
6 months 17.49 22.90 32.15 1.00
Medicare expenditures  4.486 5.187 5.576 0.53
(in $1,000) ( 0.01)
Predicted survival  94.74 94.60 94.74 0.01
(from table 4.2, column [B]) (0.88)
1st 2nd 3rd  Correlation 
tercile: tercile: tercile:  coeﬀ. ( p-value) 
AMI AMI AMI  (AMI 
expenditures expenditures expenditures expenditures)
Avg. 1 year Part A AMI 
expenditures (in $1,000) 14.06 15.40 17.42 1.00
Medicare expenditures  4.82 4.98 5.46 0.36
(in $1,000) ( 0.01)
Predicted survival  94.70 94.68 94.71 0.01
(from table 4.2, column [B]) (0.89)results are similar (the coeﬃcient for Medicare expenditures is –0.015, with
a t-statistic of 0.25), providing further support for the view that the results
are not systematically biased by unobservable health status.
Recall from our earlier discussion that one should expect to ﬁnd in the
steady state an improvement in survival rates of 0.11 from an incremental
$1,000 in Medicare expenditures per capita. However, we can reject the
null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient is 0.11 at the 0.05 signiﬁcance level for
both columns (A) and (B). Similar results obtain when AMI expenditures
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Table 4.4 Instrumental variable regression estimates of factors aﬀecting survival (dependent
variable is the one-year survival rate)
Medicare 
Physician visits,  spending, AMI 
last 6 months 1993–94 All instrumentsa
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Medicare expenditures (in $1,000) 0.009 –0.047 –0.011 –0.002 0.003
(0.2) (0.9) (0.2) (0.0) (0.1)
AMI rate (per 1,000) –.014 –.015 –.014 –.010 –.014
(1.7) (2.2) (1.7) (1.3) (1.7)
Stroke rate (per 1,000) –0.039 –0.037 –0.035 –0.028 –0.035
(4.3) (5.0) (3.8) (3.6) (3.7)
Gastrointestinal bleed rate (per 1,000) –0.048 –0.044 –0.047 –0.057 –0.049
(2.5) (2.7) (2.5) (3.1) (2.7)
Colon cancer rate (per 1,000) 0.002 0.003 –0.011 –0.019 –0.013
(0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.6) (0.3)
Lung cancer rate (per 1,000) 0.051 0.019 0.100 0.051 0.089
(0.7) (0.4) (1.3) (1.0) (1.3)
Hip fracture rate (per 1,000) –0.052 –0.056 –0.032 –0.040 –0.034
(3.8) (4.9) (2.0) (2.9) (2.3)
Fraction living in poverty 0.030 0.037 0.030 0.032 0.029
(3.8) (5.2) (3.5) (4.0) (3.4)
Avg. Social Security income (in $1,000) 0.205 0.215 0.205 0.200 0.199
(2.9) (3.3) (3.0) (4.0) (2.9)
Eﬀectiveness index 0.019 0.013 0.020 0.018 0.021
(3.4) (2.7) (4.0) (3.9) (4.1)
Constant 94.51 94.83 95.38 95.14 95.38
Regression weighted by Medicare 
population? Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.58 0.58
Notes: N   306. Additional health measures include percent high school graduates, percent college
graduates, percent of elderly population living alone, and percentage of population who are binge
drinkers, cigarette smokers, obese, and seat belt users. Robust standard errors; absolute value of t-
statistics in parentheses. All sample sizes weighted by Medicare population. Low variation conditions
(e.g., AMI, stroke) and eﬀectiveness index are from 1995–96, Medicare expenditures data are for 1996,
poverty and Social Security data from 1990 Census, and CDC behavioral data from 1997.
aInstruments are physician visits in the last six months, percentage of decedents admitted to the ICU in
their last six months, and Medicare expenditures for a cohort of AMI patients in 1993–94.are used as the instrument, as shown in columns (C) and (D); once again
the coeﬃcients on Medicare expenditures are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, and we can reject the null hypothesis of 0.11 at the 0.05 level,
while ruling out statistically the hypothesis that regional variations in
Medicare spending satisfy conditions for eﬃciency.16
Note also that in these four columns of table 4.4 the coeﬃcient on the in-
dex of eﬀective care is positive and signiﬁcant; a 10 percent increase in the
index is associated with survival rates roughly 0.2 percentage points higher.
This is large in both a clinical sense and in an economic sense; it implies
that increasing the index by 4 percentage points, or 1 standard deviation
(table 4.1), would increase survival rates by 0.8 percentage points and, us-
ing the benchmark of $100,000 per life-year, yield beneﬁts equivalent to
about $7,000 per person. This estimate should be interpreted cautiously,
since it may be the case that the eﬀectiveness index is associated with a va-
riety of other characteristics of the health care system that we have not con-
trolled for in the regression analysis.
We  include all instruments (percent with ICU days in the last six
months, as well as physician visits in the last six months, and AMI expen-
ditures) in column (E) of table 4.4. Once again, the coeﬃcient on Medicare
expenditures is not signiﬁcant and is near zero in magnitude. Furthermore,
the model does not reject an overidentiﬁcation test for the additional two
instruments (p   0.92).
4.5.3 Semiparametric Instrumental Variable Estimates
To this point, we have not allowed for nonlinearities in either S(M, Z) or
in M(R) as in equations (6) and (7). We adopt the general model developed
in Newey, Powell, and Vella (1999; hereafter NPV), but because of the lim-
itations on the size of the data set, we adopt a simple splined function S(M)
and M(X ) where the ﬁve intervals of the spline are evenly distributed along
the ranges of M and X. The NPV method estimates the ﬁrst-stage regres-
sion as in equation (7). Rather than using the ﬁtted value of M in the sec-
ond stage (as one would normally do in two-stage least squares), one uses
the nonlinear transformations of M and the ﬁtted value of the error term
from the ﬁrst-stage regression.
We estimated the simpliﬁed S(M) function with results shown in panels
A (weighted) and B (unweighted) of ﬁgure 4.7 using physician visits in the
last six months as the instrument, with the incremental gain in survival set
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16. We also experimented with a variety of other variables, such as the percentage in HMOs
and the percentage urban population. These variables tended to have similar eﬀects on the co-
eﬃcient estimates (since they were quite closely correlated) and tended to increase the coeﬃ-
cient estimate to between 0.04 and 0.06, but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, or 0.11. (Us-
ing the urban variable resulted in the loss of one HRR; Ocala, Florida, revamped its zip codes
substantially between the 1990 census and the 1996 HRR crosswalk.) Excluding HRRs with
more than 10 percentage point HMO enrollment resulted in a negative estimated eﬀect of ex-
penditures on survival (–0.147, signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level).at zero for the minimum level of Medicare expenditures. The 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals are also shown in ﬁgure 4.7; these are estimated by
bootstrapping the combined ﬁrst- and second-stage regressions.17 Rather
than having a concave shape, as is suggested by diminishing returns (as in
ﬁgure 4.3), the predicted function is convex in panel A and nearly ﬂat in
panel B. The jump up in survival in the weighted regression can be ex-
plained almost entirely by the presence of Miami, which, conditional on
other factors, is a surprisingly healthy region (e.g., Fuchs, McClellan, and
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Fig. 4.7 Semiparametric estimates of the marginal eﬀectiveness of Medicare ex-
penditures: A, weighted data; B, unweighted data
17. This is done by predicting the entire S(M) curve for each of the bootstrapped iterations,
and then graphing the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the bootstrapped values for S(M) along
the entire range of M. For computational convenience, the true distribution is evaluated for
ten evenly spaced values of M, and interpolated linearly.Skinner 2004). However, neither estimated model, nor the models esti-
mated using AMI expenditures as the instrument, rejects the hypothesis
that Medicare expenditures have zero incremental marginal eﬀectiveness.
4.5.4 Does supply-sensitive care improve functioning 
and health status rather than survival?
One might object to the statistical models because the higher rates of
health care spending may improve patient functioning rather than just sur-
vival. We have already shown that higher surgery rates in a region do not
appear correlated with higher Medicare spending, suggesting that higher-
cost regions are not simply the result of elderly patients’ demanding (and
getting) more invasive high-tech surgery. But perhaps the end-of-life
spending also provides beneﬁts with regard to a better process of care for
chronically ill patients. We provide a heuristic impression of diﬀerences in
health care intensity by considering utilization rates for two groups of re-
gions in the United States. The ﬁrst sample for the top decile of regions as
ranked by physician visits in the last six months of life (weighted by the size
of the Medicare population) during 1995–96. These regions include much
of the New York and New Jersey metropolitan areas; Takoma Park, Mary-
land; Philadelphia; and McAllen, Texas; average visits per decedent range
from thirty-six to forty-eight. The second sample is for HRRs that are clas-
siﬁed in the lowest decile of regions (decile 1); these are all regions with
fewer than sixteen visits per decedent. These include Lynchburg, Virginia;
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; and Salt Lake City, Utah.
In table 4.5, we consider rates of physician procedures (from part B
Medicare claims data), using a sample of about 32,000 decedents who died
during 1995–96 between the ages of seventy and ninety. The two groupings
of HRRs were nearly identical with regard to the age distribution of death
and broadly similar with regard to (state-level) causes of death.18 Rates are
expressed as average counts per person in the sample; thus a higher num-
ber may reﬂect more people receiving the treatment or a larger number of
treatments per person.
It is perhaps not surprising that physician visits per decedent are higher
in decile 10 than decile 1, since that is how the categories were chosen.
However, the types of visits show quite diﬀerent patterns. Outpatient oﬃce
visits were 46 percent higher in decile 10 regions, relative to our benchmark
of the lowest (decile 1) regions, and 79 percent higher for the initial visit by
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18. Cause-of-death data are from the Centers for Disease Control web site (www.cdc.gov).
Rates are adjusted for age and sex for the population over age sixty-ﬁve and are drawn from
state measures and merged (by zip code) to the relevant hospital referral regions (HRRs). The
age-adjusted mortality rates were roughly identical in the two deciles, 4.97 percent in decile
1 and 4.96 in decile 10. While the percentage of deaths due to cancer in the two groups was
similar (22.7 percent in decile 10, 22.1 percent in decile 1), as was diabetes (2.6 and 2.7 per-
cent), cardiovascular diseases were higher in decile 10 (49.1 percent versus 44.1 percent), and
chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases were lower (4.9 versus 5.8 percent).the physician when the patient was admitted to the hospital. The real
diﬀerences occur for the initial visit by a specialist newly brought on to the
case (392 percent more in decile 10 regions). In other words, there is greater
scope intensity—more specialists treating separate organs or systems—in
regions with a large number of physician visits in the last six months of life.
Regions in the top decile are also characterized by their greater use of
diagnostic techniques such as endoscopies, X-rays, Doppler echocardio-
grams, and electrocardiograms; their use is between 106 and 235 percent
greater in decile 10 regions. Finally, the greatest divergence in speciﬁc med-
ical procedures comes in those that are used to maintain survival among
seriously and chronically ill patients: insertions of emergency airways, dial-
ysis for failing kidneys (hemodyalisis), feeding tubes inserted into the
stomach (gastrostomy tube placement), and mechanical breathing assis-
tance (continuous ventilator management). These rates are consistently
higher, with rates in decile 10 ranging from 233 percent to 674 percent
above those in decile 1. Note that these procedures are not designed to im-
prove quality of life but instead are directed toward maintaining short-
term survival. In short, it seems unlikely that this supply-sensitive care
could be justiﬁed on the basis of improving quality of life for Medicare pa-
tients.
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Table 4.5 Rates of speciﬁc procedures per 1,000 decedents, by regional frequency of physician
visits in last six months
Highest decile of  Lowest decile of 
physician visits during  physician visits during 
Physician service code last six months last six months Ratio
Physician visits
Physician oﬃce outpatient visits 4,453 3,051 1.46
Physician visit for initial hospital care 1,442 804 1.79
Specialist initial inpatient consult 3,087 628 4.92
Diagnostic testing
Upper gastrointestinal endoscopy 132 64 2.06
Cat scan of head/skull/brain 492 236 2.08
Chest x-ray 6,631 2,700 2.46
Doppler/echocardiagram of heart 799 268 2.98
Electrocardiogram and report 3,888 1,161 3.35
Treatments for serious chronic illnesses
Insertion of emergency airway 140 42 3.33
Hemodialysis (related to kidney failure) 384 87 4.41
Gastrostomy tube placement/change 
(feeding tube) 136 25 5.44
Continuous ventilator management 
(mechanical breathing apparatus) 387 50 7.74
Notes: Age 75–90; N   15,097 (Decile 1); N   17,225 (Decile 10). 4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to test whether the Medicare program
is broadly consistent with the eﬃciency criterion commonly used in public
economics where the marginal social value of the last dollar spent on spe-
ciﬁc types of health care (in each region) is equal to the marginal social
beneﬁts of the dollar that could have been spent for other worthy causes.
We used data on survival rates, Medicare expenditures, and health status
measures across 306 hospital referral regions in the United States to test
these hypotheses. Our best estimates of the incremental value of Medicare
spending with regard to eﬀective care suggests that spending for these
types of services is too low, especially considering how this type of care is
associated with overall Medicare expenditures. On the other hand, the
supply-sensitive dimension of care is a major factor in explaining overall
Medicare expenditures—roughly 20 percent annually—but does not show
any impact in terms of improving survival rates across regions. These re-
sults suggest that the ineﬃciency inherent in the Medicare program is as
much as 20 percent of total Medicare expenditures.19
One explanation for these results is that while survival may not be im-
proved, patients either enjoy better health functioning or they may simply
prefer preference-sensitive care. However, neither the results presented
here nor other studies provide much support for this view (see, e.g.,
Guadagnoli et al. 1995). In the SUPPORT study, seriously ill patients were
asked about their preferences regarding dying in the hospital and intensive
life-saving care, and eﬀorts were made to ensure that they got what they
wanted (Lynn et al. 2000). However, there was no correlation between ex-
pressed preferences and what they actually got; Pritchard and others
(1998) found the only predictor of whether patients died in the hospital was
the supply of hospital beds in the area. And when asked directly, patients
in high-intensity regions (based on overall expenditures in the last six
months of life) did not respond that they enjoyed better access to care, nor
were they more satisﬁed with their care (Fisher et al. 2003a,b).
One potential shortcoming with this study is the diﬃculty in interpret-
ing “the” eﬀect of an instrumental variable on health care across regions.
The problem is the highly multidimensional nature of a health care system.
For example, when we observe that regions with higher values of physician
visits in the last six months of life also experience higher Medicare expen-
ditures, we cannot specify exactly along what dimensions the quality and
quantity of care diﬀer. Physician visits for chronically ill patients (many of
whom are in their last six months), or AMI inpatient care, could be a pro-
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19. Fisher and others (2003a,b) suggest an even larger percentage based on their cohort
analysis.ductive use of Medicare funds, but the other unobserved treatment char-
acteristics with which these are correlated may not be. Or it could be the
case that incremental physician visits in the last six months of life are not
particularly eﬃcacious, and by choosing a marker most likely associated
with ineﬃcient care, we are predisposed toward ﬁnding that Medicare ex-
penditures don’t have a large impact on outcomes. In this latter case, the
surprising result is therefore not that these factors have an indiﬀerent im-
pact on outcomes but that these factors are so highly correlated with over-
all Medicare expenditures, even after controlling for obvious covariates.
There are three other potential objections to the methodology of the
study. The ﬁrst is that using end-of-life measures of treatment can bias re-
sults, given that the eﬀectiveness of the regional health care system will
tend to aﬀect the denominator of who is in the end-of-life sample. How-
ever, in this case the bias will tend to go toward ﬁnding that Medicare ex-
penditures improve survival. Suppose that region A is more aggressive and
more eﬀective in treating patients than region B. As a consequence, some
of the patients receiving the most aggressive (and expensive) care in region
A survive, and hence they do not appear in the end-of-life sample. Hence,
region A’s end-of-life spending would be biased downward, making it ap-
pear relatively more cost eﬀective.
A second objection is that if regions are already optimizing with regard
to their Medicare expenditures (i.e., they are at points A, B, and C in ﬁgure
4.3), one would not expect to ﬁnd any diﬀerence in outcomes conditional
on expenditures. Any variation in Medicare expenditures (and in out-
comes) observed in the data is for other factors not adequately captured by
the regression model—for example, because of unobservable health needs.
However, it seems diﬃcult to reconcile how these unmeasured factors
would be so highly correlated with the measures of health care intensity,
given that our health care intensity measures for supply-sensitive care are
not themselves correlated with observable health needs.
A ﬁnal concern with the paper is that we are not learning about the eﬃ-
ciency of Medicare per se, because Medicare is an insurance program that
is designed to protect the ﬁnancial health of enrollees, rather than a direct
provider of health care such as the Veterans Aﬀairs hospital system.
Strictly speaking, to evaluate the eﬃciency of the Medicare program, one
would need to compare the current system to the counterfactual structure
of health and health care that would have occurred had Barry Goldwater
won the election in 1964 and chosen not to push forward universal health
care for the elderly. Absent such an exercise, however, we can ask whether
the Medicare program, in its developing role as health regulator rather
than passive insurance agency, is getting its money’s worth by allowing pro-
viders in some states to provide a much higher level of health care intensity
(or allowing consumers to receive a much higher level of health care inten-
sity) than in other states.
154 Jonathan Skinner, Elliott S. Fisher, and John E. WennbergThis macro-level study does not provide an easy prescription for how to
ﬁx the Medicare program or how to encourage the greater use of eﬀective
care. The Medicare program is federal, with roughly uniform prices paid
for procedures (apart from cost-of-living adjustments), so that one cannot
appeal to diﬀerences in relative nominal prices to explain why Miami
spends so much more than other regions in the United States. Nor can re-
imbursement rates be lowered in high-cost regions without risking a re-
sponse by physicians of increasing the number of procedures. (As well,
lower reimbursement rates in high-cost regions punish those physicians
who do practice conservative care.) Still, the potential beneﬁts of reducing
regional variation—a saving of nearly 20 percent of current Medicare ex-
penditures—suggests that a central focus of Medicare research should be
to better understand why and how some regions are able to provide eﬀec-
tive care at relatively low cost.
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Comment Alan M. Garber
This paper is part of a rich tradition of research exploring geographic vari-
ation in the utilization of medical services. John Wennberg, one of the
coauthors, is a pioneer in this ﬁeld of research, which has demonstrated the
pervasiveness of variation (Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973). Variation has
been documented in multiple settings and at diﬀerent periods of time, and
it is not fully explained by diﬀerences in the prevalence of disease or in
other observed health characteristics of the populations (Phelps and
Mooney 1993). The literature suggests that supply factors, though they are
incompletely measured, may play an important role (Wennberg, Barnes,
and Zubkoﬀ 1982). This literature also documents that variation tends to
be greater when there is greater uncertainty about the eﬀectiveness of care.
Thus, the propensity to hospitalize patients with heart attacks, for ex-
ample, is much less variable than the use of surgery as a treatment for back
pain, for which high-quality evidence of eﬀectiveness is scant.
If variation in utilization is not attributable to unmeasured health char-
acteristics, there is at least a presumption that someone, somewhere, is not
providing care eﬃciently. Then it might be possible to reallocate health re-
sources to improve health without increasing resource consumption. This
is the issue that Skinner and colleagues explore, looking speciﬁcally at the
Medicare program.
The Medicare population might appear at ﬁrst to be an odd choice for a
study of practice variation. One would expect to see extensive variation in
utilization among the nonelderly population, if only because many lack in-
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nomic Research.surance and cost-sharing provisions of commercial health insurance poli-
cies vary greatly. Among the elderly, hospital insurance coverage under
Medicare part A is eﬀectively universal, and the overwhelming majority of
elderly have Medicare part B coverage. A large majority also have supple-
mental (Medigap) private insurance. Thus, health insurance coverage
among the elderly would seem to be far more uniform than among Amer-
icans younger than sixty-ﬁve years of age. Nevertheless, as Skinner and
colleagues show, the elderly in diﬀerent parts of the country receive diﬀer-
ent amounts and forms of care.
What does “eﬃciency” mean? According to Skinner and colleagues, eﬃ-
ciency requires that beneﬁts from Medicare expenditures be equated at the
margin across diﬀerent geographic units. One can readily imagine that if
beneﬁciaries in Miami are treated more intensively than similar patients in
Chicago, and there are diminishing marginal beneﬁts to treatment, a real-
location of resources from Miami to Chicago would result in an improve-
ment of health outcomes among Medicare beneﬁciaries overall.
To test eﬃciency empirically, they develop an econometric speciﬁcation
in which survival is a function of expenditures, which is a proxy for inten-
sity. The problem with expenditures (or intensity) is that they are un-
doubtedly endogenous and inﬂuenced by unmeasured health character-
istics. As instruments for intensity, they use a few measures, most
prominently physician visits per decedent in the last six years of life within
the unit area. A secondary set of instruments consists of expenditures for
patients admitted for hip fracture.
The interpretation of the empirical results depends in large part upon
one’s view of the validity of the instruments. There are few examples of
good instruments in studies of health care and health outcomes. One im-
portant exception is myocardial infarction, in which location of residence
strongly inﬂuences the choice of treating hospital. Myocardial infarction,
or heart attack, is considered a true medical emergency, so there is little op-
portunity for selection eﬀects. Patients with symptoms of heart attacks are
usually admitted to the nearest hospital, whether it is a small community
hospital or a major referral center. Thus, proximity to an advanced hospi-
tal (capable of performing cardiac catheterization and heart surgery) can
serve as a measure of intensity of care that is plausibly independent of pa-
tient characteristics (McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse 1994).
One can argue that area-wide intensity measures, such as treatment
within the last six months of life, are independent of individual patient
characteristics and are therefore valid instruments, though it is also easy to
posit circumstances in which such an instrument is not valid. The inter-
pretation of the instrument depends upon the sources of variation in treat-
ment intensity at the end of life and one’s views about the diﬀerence be-
tween the intensity of end-of-life care and the intensity of care overall.
If the correlation between physician visits at the end of life and the gen-
158 Jonathan Skinner, Elliott S. Fisher, and John E. Wennbergeral intensity of care is perfect, we need not worry about which measure is
used. But if the two measures are not highly correlated, physicians in re-
gions with high intensity at the end of life might be allocating (relative to
other areas) more intensive treatment to people who won’t beneﬁt. In itself,
this would be an interesting ﬁnding, but its interpretation is diﬀerent from
the interpretation that one would attach to a relationship between general
intensity and outcomes. Intensive care in general might have a positive
marginal eﬀect on survival and other health outcomes, while intensive care
(or physician visits) at the end of life might have no eﬀect on outcomes.
That is, there is no contradiction between the statement that Medicare ben-
eﬁciaries who live in regions that treat dying patients intensively do not
have better health outcomes, and the statement that regions that generally
treat Medicare beneﬁciaries more intensively have better outcomes. Con-
sequently, policies that reduced overall intensity might lead to worsened
health outcomes, even if there was no relationship between end-of-life in-
tensity and health.
The deﬁnition of eﬃciency is a crucial consideration for this work. By
asking whether treatment intensity is equated at the margin across regions,
Skinner and colleagues are implicitly addressing movement along a pro-
duction possibility frontier. But they note that there is substantial variation
in “process quality” of care, or in compliance with generally accepted
guidelines for care. Although such variation may in part reﬂect intensity
and represent diﬀerent points on a production possibility frontier, varia-
tion in process quality can be a manifestation of x-ineﬃciency. That is,
poor performance on process quality measures may mean that the care in
some areas is interior to the production possibility frontier.
Movement along a production possibility frontier and elimination of 
x-ineﬃciency can both lead to better health outcomes for given expendi-
tures. However, they are not likely to be equally acceptable, nor do they
have the same economic implications. Elimination of x-ineﬃciency means
that no Medicare beneﬁciary need be made worse oﬀ—that is, an actual
Pareto improvement is possible. Movement along a production possibility
frontier may satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, meaning that it will gener-
ate a potential Pareto improvement, but that does not mean that an actual
Pareto improvement will occur. Residents of areas that use care more in-
tensively will have to receive less care to equate treatment intensity at the
margin across areas. If they do not receive compensation, they will be made
worse oﬀ. Any policy that led to this shift of resources would meet with
strong political resistance. Elimination of x-ineﬃciency would be an im-
portant contribution to health and health care, while movement along the
production possibility frontier may be more feasible in the lecture hall than
in the real world of medical practice.
This paper asks the right questions and analyzes a rich data set to pro-
vide some tentative yet provocative answers. It establishes the importance
The Eﬃciency of Medicare 159of learning more about the causes of variation in intensity and about the
consequences of intensity variation for health. Until such information is
forthcoming, though, the work by Skinner and colleagues casts doubt on
the belief that more care inevitably leads to better health outcomes.
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